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Case Notes
TORTS-PRODUCTS LIABILITY-Lesser Quality Component Parts
Do Not Render an Engine Defective Merely Because More Tech-
nologically Advanced Parts Are Available, Nor Do Service Recom-
mendations Create an Implied Warranty When an Express War-
ranty Is Present, but Breach of Contract and Negligence Actions
Based On the Inferior Condition of the Engine Are Not Precluded.
Fisher v. Bell Helicopter Co., 403 F. Supp. 1165 (D.D.C. 1975).
Police Officer Fisher was injured on April 5, 1973, when the
Juneau III, a helicopter owned by the District of Columbia (Dis-
trict) and operated by its Metropolitan Police Department, crashed
because its engine failed when a bolt parted.1 The helicopter had
been manufactured and sold by Bell Helicopter Company (Bell);
the engine was manufactured and sold to Bell by Avco-Lycoming
Corporation (Avco); and the last major overhaul had been per-
formed by Saguaro Aviation Corporation (Saguaro) prior to the
crash.
The aircraft was originally obtained by the District under a
lease-purchase agreement requiring Bell to maintain the craft in
compliance with applicable Avco service bulletins! and FAA di-
rectives. In May of 1972, Saguaro overhauled the engine, replac-
ing the rod assemblies with those sent to it by Avco, on Bell's
instruction. The bolts used were not shot-peened.' After the over-
haul by Saguaro, Avco issued service bulletins 303B and 303C,
which were applicable to the Juneau III engine, recommending
that rod assemblies with shot-peened bolts be installed in all engines
I Contrary to FAA directive 73-5-1, issued Feb. 1, 1973, the engine rods were
not bolted with shot-peened bolts and the bearings were not chrome-backed.
, Avco issues service bulletins to alert customers and users of its engines to
improvements and recommended operating procedures. These service bulletins
are kept at maintenance facilities and are relied on by mechanics and operators.
' Of the twelve bolts, only two were shot-peened. In the late 1960's it was
recognized that connecting rod bolts would wear due to stress and cause bolt
fatigue and failure. The shot-peened bolt was developed to help prevent this.
Such bolts, by reason of a dimpling effect, retain lubrication and lessen wear as
the bolt gradually fatigues.
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having 550 hours within the next fifty hours, at the owner's discre-
tion.'
By November 4, 1972, when the District exercised its right to
purchase under the lease-purchase agreement and became respon-
sible for all maintenance work, the Juneau III had logged 552
hours.' When FAA directive 73-5-1, effective February 28, 1973,
ordered the rod installation previously recommended in Avco Bul-
letins,' 772 hours had been logged on the Juneau III engine, and by
crash time, the engine had logged 917 hours with rod bolts and
bearings not in compliance with the FAA directive.! Investigations
after the crash disclosed that the bolt which failed had had a pre-
existing fatigue fracture, and it was established that if the Juneau
III engine had had shot-peened rod bolts, the helicopter would not
have crashed when it did
At the time of purchase, the District was advised by Bell that
the Juneau III engine complied with Service Bulletins 303B and
303C, when in fact this was not the case." Relying on Bell's assur-
ances that the Juneau III engine was in compliance, the District
did nothing when the FAA directive was issued."0
The bulletin stated, among other things:
REASON FOR CHANGE: The heavy reinforced connecting rod
assemblies with phosphated bearing surface treatment (P/N LW-
10776) to minimize galling has not shown improvement in extend-
ing connecting rod service as intended. The use of reinforced heavy
type rod P/N 77450 which does not have the phosphate treatment
in conjunction with bearing inserts with chrome backing is recom-
mended. Also, the 77450 connecting rod assemblies are furnished
with improved stretch type bolts of higher hardness with the addi-
tion of surface shot-peening to improve and minimize bolt fatigue.
The engine was already operating within the fifty-hour grace period. The
lease agreement required Bell to replace the assemblies before 600 hours.
0 This directive required all engines which had logged 550 hours to have the
new #77450 connecting rod assemblies within 50 hours.
'FAA directive 73-5-1.
1 Avco's chief engineer indicated that shot-peening would extend bolt life,
once fatigue set in, by up to 20 hours.
'The connecting rod bolts were not shot-peened and the bearings were not
chrome backed. The engine, at the time of purchase, required new rod assemblies
within 50 hours. This involves removal of the engine and extensive mechanical
work.
11 The District filed a negligence claim against Avco, but the action failed be-
cause the court found the District to be contributorily negligent for not deter-
mining whether the engine was in compliance with the mandatory FAA directive.
The court also found, however, that the conduct of the District was a concurring
rather than a superseding cause and that Avco was therefore not relieved of
liability to Fisher.
1977] CASE NOTES
Fisher sued Avco, Saguaro and Bell under negligence, warranty
and strict liability theories.
Held: Lesser quality component parts do not render an engine
defective merely because more technologically advanced parts are
available, nor do service recommendations create an implied war-
ranty when an express warranty is present, but breach of contract
and negligence actions based on the inferior condition of the
engine are not precluded. Fisher v. Bell Helicopter Co., 403 F.
Supp. 1165 (D.D.C. 1975).
The law of product liability1 has developed rapidly in recent
years, moving in less than a century from caveat emptor" through
theories based on negligence13 and breach of express or implied
warranty" to strict liability in tort."5 The products liability plaintiff
has been able to charge manufacturers, sellers and suppliers with
liability under each of these three modem theories." An aircraft
manufacturer has essentially the same legal duties and responsi-
bilities for product safety as the manufacturer of any other
product." The impact and implications of Fisher can be explored
"Products liability is the name used to describe that area of law involving
the liability of sellers or suppliers of products to third persons with whom they
are not in privity of contract. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS,
641 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter PROSSER].
12 The common law rule was that losses should be borne by the individual in-
curring them unless a valid reason existed for shifting them from one person to
another. "Let the buyer beware." Id. at 641-42.
'" See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).4 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
"See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897
(1963).
1" Liability can arise through negligence. See Bell Aerospace v. Anderson,
478 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Manos v.
T.W.A., 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291
F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961). It can also arise from the breach of an express war-
ranty. See Banko v. Continental Motors, 373 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1966); FRUMER
& FREEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrry, 5 16.04(4) (1968). Liability can also arise
on a breach of implied warranty. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Holcomb v. Cessna, 439 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1971).
In most states and in the District of Columbia, liability can also arise under doc-
trine of strict liability in tort. See Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Service, Inc., 262
A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970).
"See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955).
See generally McCoy, Manufacturer's Responsibility, 34 J. Am L. & CoM. 489
(1968); 1 L. KRIENDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW S 7.02(6) (rev. ed. 1972).
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most efficiently by considering each of these theories in turn.
Establishing the defective condition of the injury-inflicting
product is the key to all product liability cases. A legally defective
product has been loosely defined as one in such defective condi-
tion that it does not meet the reasonable expectations of the con-
sumer."8 The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) defines defec-
tive products as those not "fit for ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used."1 An alternative definition is found in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, section 402, which instead of setting a
standard of compliance sets a standard of non-compliance, i.e., that
anyone who sells any product in a defective condition which is un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for injury caused by the defect."0 Others
attempt to define "defective" products by a flexible standard, bal-
ancing the utility of the product against the risk.'1 Although it is
obvious that no precise definition of a "defective condition" has
been agreed upon, it is equally obvious that "defective condition"
has not been limited to improper design or manufacture." The
seller or supplier must provide the product with every element
necessary to make it safe for use." One such element may be
warnings or instructions concerning the use or limitations of the
product.' Where the product is defective because of the absence
of such warnings, the supplier may be liable even without proof of
negligence. Similarly, misinformation supplied or inadequate in-
"8 See generally Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product
Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967). The author concludes, at 331, that a
synthesis of present day trends would define a legally defective product as fol-
lows: 1) The product carries a significant physical risk to a definable class of
consumer and the risk is ascertainable at least by the time of trial. 2) The risk
is one that the typical member of the class does not anticipate and guard against.
3) The risk threatens established consumer expectations with respect to a con-
templated minimum level of performance. 4) The seller has reason to know of
the contemplated use and possibly, where injurious side effects are involved, has
reasonable access to knowledge of the particular risk involved. 5) The seller
knowingly participates in creating the contemplated use or in otherwise generat-
ing the relevant consumer expectations in the way attributed to him by the con-
sumer.
19 U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (1972).
'°RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 (1965).
1 See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
" Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
2Id.
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment (h) (1965).
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formation given concerning the dangers involved in the use of the
product may render the product defective."
Under the negligence theory, the manufacturer or supplier is
required to exercise reasonable care to assure that the product sold
will do no harm to the buyer or the ultimate user.2" To recover in
a products liability suit based on negligence, the plaintiff must
first establish that injury was inflicted by the product. Second, he
must show that the injury occurred because the product was de-
fective or unreasonably unsafe. Third, he must prove that the de-
fect existed when the product left the hands of the defendant.
Without proof of each of these elements, the action must fail.27
With respect to the warranty theory, the U.C.C. provides that an
express warranty is given when any affirmation of fact or promise
is made by the seller and the buyer relies on those statements. In
25 See Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971); Barth v. B.F.
Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968). See also
PROSSER, § 99 (4th ed. 1971).
28 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916). Judge Cardozo set forth the rationale as:
We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not
limited to poisons, explosives, and ... things which in their normal
operation are implements of destruction. If the nature of a thing
is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril
when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives
warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of
danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by
persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then,
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is
under a duty to make it carefully. That is as far as we are required
to go for the decision of this case. There must be knowledge of a
danger, not merely possible, but probable. It is possible to use al-
most anything in a way that will make it dangerous if defective.
That is not enough to charge the manufacturer with a duty inde-
pendent of his contract. Whether a given thing is dangerous may
be sometimes a question for the court and sometimes a question
for the jury. There must also be knowledge that in the usual course
of events the danger will be shared by others than the buyer.
Such knowledge may often be inferred from the nature of the trans-
action. But it is possible that even knowledge of the danger and of
the use will not always be enough. The proximity or remoteness
of the relation is a factor to be considered. We are dealing now
with the liability of the manufacturer of the finished product, who
puts it on the market to be used without inspection by his cus-
tomers. If he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability
will follow.
27 See generally, PROSSER, S 103 (4th ed. 1971).
2 8 U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (1972) reads:
a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
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the absence of an express warranty which explicitly excludes all
other warranties, two additional warranties are implied by the
U.C.C. A warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises when a
seller has reason to know of the buyer's particular purpose in buy-
ing the article," and an implied warranty of merchantability arises
to ensure that the product is fit for ordinary purposes for which the
goods are used."0 If any of these warranties is breached, an action
on the contract will lie.
Strict liability in tort is defined in section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.8 This doctrine was expressed in the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall con-
form to the affirmation or promise. b) Any description of the goods
which is made part of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods shall conform to the description. c) Any sample or model
which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample
or model.
29U.C.C. § 2-315, comment (1) (1972) reads:
Whether or not this warranty arises in any individual case is basic-
ally a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances of the
contracting. Under this section the buyer need not bring home to
the seller actual knowledge of the particular purpose for which the
goods are intended or of his reliance on the seller's skill and judg-
ment, if the circumstances are such that the seller has reason to
realize the purpose intended or that the reliance exists. The buyer,
of course, must actually be relying on the seller.
80U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (1972) reads:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as: a) pass
without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used; and d) run, within the variations permitted by
agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and
among all units involved; and e) are adequately contained, pack-
aged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and f) conform
to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), states:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer. 1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer or to his property, if: a) the seller is en-
gaged in the business of selling such product, and b) it is expected
to and does reach the consumer or user without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although a) the seller
has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
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landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,"'
where a defectively designed and manufactured combination power
tool propelled a piece of wood at the plaintiff, severely injuring
him. Justice Traynor held that "a manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes' injury to a human being. '))3
The elements of the strict liability action are: (1) the product
is defective and unreasonably dangerous; (2) the defect existed
when the product left the manufacturer; (3) the plaintiff was in-
jured; and (4) the product was the cause in fact of the injury."4
Similarly, a person who is in the business of selling specific prod-
ucts is held strictly liable when the product reaches the consumer
without a substantial change from the condition in which it was
sold and injury results from the defect.' The maker, however, is
only required to produce a reasonably safe product, not necessarily
the best product. The crucial issue is whether there is "a defective
product unreasonably dangerous."" A flexible standard using a bal-
ancing approach appears to be the most equitable guide for both
product, and b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1962). Chief
Justice Traynor refused to apply the traditional warranty concept, stating:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on
the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the
manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement
of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is
not assumed by agreement but imposed by law . . . , and the re-
fusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own
responsibility for defective products . . . make clear that the liabil-
ity is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the
law of strict liability in tort.
13 The term "seller" is used generically to include all suppliers of products
who, because they are engaged in the business of selling or supplying a product,
may be said to have "undertaken and assumed a special responsibility" toward
the consuming public and who are in position to spread the risk of defective
products. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment (c). The actual
form of the transactions of such suppliers, whether by sale, lease or bailment,
should not alter their obligations. Occasional suppliers who are not in the busi-
ness of selling or supplying such products are not "sellers" subject to strict liabil-
ity.
3' See note 31 supra.
15 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, § 7.04(1) (1971).
'6 See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
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the manufacturer and the injured party." Relevant factors under
this balancing approach are: (1) usefulness of the product; (2)
available substitutes; (3) likelihood and seriousness of injury; (4)
obviousness of the danger; (5) common knowledge of the danger;
(6) avoidability of injury by care in use of product; and (7) ease
of eliminating the danger." Again, liability under this strict liability
theory is based on the determination of the defectiveness or ade-
quacy of the product.
A suit based on strict liability is preferable to a warranty action
from the plaintiff's point of view because no contract is involved,
so that disclaimers or privity requirements will not be held applic-
able by the court. Strict liability has been applied to remote pur-
chasers, users, consumers, passengers and even bystanders, since
it is now recognized by most courts that a manufacturer has a re-
sponsibility to the ultimate user based upon nothing more than the
fact that he has so dealt with the goods that they are likely to come
into the hands of another and do harm if they are defective."
The Fisher court, in applying these theories, found Bell to be
under a contractual duty to reveal the engine's true condition, thus
justifying imposition of the liability set out in the lease-purchase
agreement, which provided that Bell would be liable for all dam-
ages caused by a defective product."0 It further concluded that the
plaintiff's claim of strict liability was without merit, finding that
the use of non-shot-peened bolts did not create a defective condi-
tion for strict liability purposes, reasoning that although shot-
peening was a technological advancement, it did not automatically
37/d.
8 Id.
"See 1 L. KREINDLER, supra note 35.
40 Paragraph L of the Lease-purchase agreement reads:
Responsibility for Damages: The Contractor shall be liable for all
damages to property of the District of Columbia caused by (i) the
contractor's providing of defective rented property, (ii) the con-
tractor's defective maintenance of rented property .... or (iii) the
negligent operation of the rented property by the contractor or its
employees and shall hold the District of Columbia harmless for all
claims for damages caused to third persons or property of third per-
sons arising out of (i) the contractor's providing of defective rented
property, (ii) the contractor's defective maintenance of rented prop-
erty . . . , or (iii) the negligent operation of the rented property
by the contractor or its employees, and all other times except when
operated by or at direction of District of Columbia employees.
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render all non-shot-peened bolts- defective. Since no evidence was
presented indicating the bolts were improperly manufactured or
were otherwise unsatisfactory in comparison with other non-shot-
peened bolts, the claim was denied. A warranty claim for safe
operation of the engine for one thousand hours was rejected, al-
though service schedule recommendations stated that no overhaul
need be performed until one thousand hours were logged, and
the court further held that warranties of merchantability or fitness
for a particular purpose were not implied. Finally, the court im-
posed liability upon Avco for negligently failing to differentiate
between part numbers.
The court in Fisher encountered an excellent opportunity to de-
fine the parameters of product liability, but it unfortunately refused
to consider important issues and reached several inconsistent con-
clusions. The determination that the product is defective is the
focal point of any products liability analysis, since unless the
product is defective, no liability will be imposed under any of the
three theories. It is on this issue of the defective condition of the
helicopter that the court displayed its inconsistency. The judge
apparently determined that the necessary elements of a negligence
action were established, since Avco was held to be negligent for
failing to differentiate between part identification numbers,"' and
this negligence was found to be the proximate cause of the acci-
dent. Implicit in this conclusion are that the lack of shot-peening
must have caused the injury-inflicting accident, that absent a warn-
ing that the non-shot-peened bolts were installed the aircraft was
unreasonably unsafe, and that the non-shot-peened bolts were
supplied by the defendant Avco, or else liability under the negli-
gence theory should not have been imposed, since it is not negligent
to market a product which functions properly. The failure to warn
or adequately label the product should have been an obvious basis
for imposition of strict liability. It was foreseeable that the failure
to renumber the parts would cause damage when the lesser quality
parts were installed in place of the higher quality parts, thereby
creating a less than adequate, or defective, product; otherwise, with-
out foreseeability that an unsafe product would be created by the
41 Avco had used the number 77450 to designate various connecting rods since
1971. The rod assemblies sent to Saguaro for the overhaul were designated 77450,
but did not have shot-peened bolts.
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installation of a lesser quality part, no liability under the negligence
theory should have been found. Strict liability should also be im-
posed for marketing the aircraft without adequate warning of
the condition of the engine containing non-shot-peened bolts.
Either the court determined the product was defective, which it
denied, or no liability should have been imposed under any theory.
If the court actually did find the helicopter to be defective, it was
highly inconsistent in imposing liability for negligently creating a
defective helicopter, while denying the defective condition in
strict liability and warranty actions.
The court also refused to permit recovery under a breach of
warranty theory. The plaintiff had asserted that there was an im-
plied warranty for safe operation of the engine for one thousand
hours, since the service schedule clearly stated that no overhaul
need be performed until one thousand hours were logged and the
aircraft crashed after only 917 hours. The court was unwilling to
imply such a warranty without further evidence, even though it
was not shown that the express warranty explicitly excluded an
implied warranty. Regardless of the service schedule recommenda-
tions, the U.C.C. warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose should have been considered and implied, since
exclusionary clauses were not produced in evidence.'
The court determined that the non-shot-peened bolts were not
of lesser quality than other non-shot-peened bolts, and therefore
the product was not defective. This ignores the fact that although
the bolts themselves were not inferior, their presence within the
engine of the Juneau III rendered the aircraft defective. The mere
fact that a bolt of greater quality had been developed did not cre-
ate a defective engine when the non-shot-peened bolts were in-
stalled, but the failure to warn that the bolts were not of supreme
quality and were not likely to last as long did render the engine
defective. ' The engine was not safe for the extended usage for
which Bell knew the aircraft was being purchased. In fact, the
aircraft was already within the grace period at the time of pur-
- U.C.C. § 2-316 (1972). The existence of an express warranty will not
destroy implied warranties unless it explicitly excludes such implied warranties.
4' See generally Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions
or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.. 256 (1969); Harp v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 336
F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964); Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir.
1961).
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chase, and, therefore, without a warning that the non-shot-peened
bolts were installed, the engine was neither safe nor fit for the
purpose for which it was purchased, thus breaching the implied
warranty of fitness. The fact that the defect was not immediately
damaging or immediately apparent should be of no consequence."
Neither should the lack of privity matter, since such warranties of
fitness may run in favor of those not in privity of contract, such as
pilots and stewardesses, ' and it is well settled in the Washington,
D.C. jurisdiction that privity of contract is not a requirement in im-
plied warranty actions." In spite of all this, however, the court did
not find an implied warranty, apparently determining that the air-
craft was not defective under the warranty theory, but was reason-
ably fit for the purpose for which it was sold.
The court further refused to find the Juneau III defective under
the strict liability theory, reasoning that while shot-peening was a
technological advancement, it did not automatically render all non-
shot-peened bolts defective. Using a modem balancing standard,
however, the court could have found the helicopter itself defective
since the danger could have easily been eliminated, superior sub-
stitutes were available, the seriousness of potential injury was
obvious, and the pilot could do virtually nothing to prevent dam-
age after the product malfunction. The occurrence of a mal-
function in absence of abnormal usage and reasonable secondary
causes is evidence of a defective condition within the meaning of
section 402A." The court seemed to require that the component
part which renders the engine defective must itself be defective
before the strict liability is imposed, and therefore declined to apply
strict liability in tort. Following such a requirement to its logical
conclusion, any extremely dangerous product could be placed on
"Agostino v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co., 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 434, 345 A.2d
735 (1975); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A.2d
707 (1971); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966).
'"Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81
(1963); Pickerd X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C.
1962).
4Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970); Pickerd
X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1962).
'
7 See Wojciechowski v. Long-Airdox Division of Marmon Group, Inc., 488
F.2d 1111 (3d Cir. 1973); D'Antona v. Hampton Grinding Wheel Co., Inc., 225
Pa. Super. 120, 310 A.2d 307 (1973); Burchill v. Kearney-National Corp., 468
F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1972).
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the market without risking strict liability in tort so long as the com-
ponent parts are not themselves defective. This conclusion is re-
pugnant to the spirit behind all products liability.
The modem day law of products liability has been derived to a
great extent from the current social thinking that the financial
burdens of personal catastrophes should be borne by those whom
society perceives as better equipped to bear the loss. All manu-
facturers continue to face increasing exposure to legal liability for
injuries related to their products. It is now recognized by most
courts that a manufacturer has a responsibility to the ultimate con-
sumer based upon nothing more than the fact that he has so dealt
with the goods that they are likely to come into the hands of an-
other and do harm if they are defective. The manufacturer is
liable for the total product after all component parts have been
installed. Even so, the maker is not required to produce the best
possible product, or one as good as others make, or a better product
than the one he has, so long as it is a reasonably safe product. The
key determination must involve the presence or absence of a de-
fect in the product. The court in Fisher adopted a very limited
definition of "defective" by requiring the component part to be
defective before liability is imposed under strict liability in tort
or implied warranty; such a limited definition effectively defeats
the purpose of strict liability in tort. Surely, the installation of a
part not designed for such an engine would result in a defective
engine, because it cannot function up to the reasonable expecta-
tions of the consumer. Therefore, the installation of a part of lesser
quality, with assurances that the part is of greater quality, should
also result in a defective engine, because it, too, cannot function
up to the reasonable expectation of the purchaser. This should
properly have been considered a defective engine, not capable of
performing up to the standards of an ordinary consumer who be-
lieves he has purchased an engine capable of extended usage.
Even if strict liability were not imposed, some form of warranty
should be found in the representations of the seller that the
superior parts are installed in the engine. The seller knew that
the buyer intended to make use of the aircraft as a police helicopter
and use it for an extended period and that the craft would not be
overhauled until long after the non-shot-peened bolts had become
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unsafe. The public interest in human life and safety demands the
maximum possible protection for those using such machines. The
seller, by offering the helicopter for sale, represented that it was
suitable and safe for use. He should not have been allowed to avoid
liability by the mere proof that no individual component part was
defective. The engine malfunctioned at a time when it would not
have done so had the superior parts been installed." This alone
might not be a basis for liability, but coupled with the assertions
that superior parts were installed, the machine becomes defective
because it does not conform to reasonable consumer expectations
for the superior engine. The engine was likely to develop a defect
which would make the product unreasonably dangerous for those
purposes for which it would foreseeably be used.
The court, while expressly rejecting the classification of the heli-
copter as "defective" for purposes of strict liability, apparently
found the aircraft to be defective for purposes of negligence, and
negligence liability was imposed on Avco for not renumbering the
parts, and thereby causing a premature engine failure. If the en-
gine was not defective in relation to the assurances given of its
superior quality, liability for negligently creating a defective en-
gine should not be imposed. Further, the court imposed contractual
liability, making paragraph "L" of the lease agreement applicable."'
That paragraph imposed responsibility for damages on the seller
for providing a defective product. If the helicopter is defective
under contract and negligence theories, it should not have become
adequate under strict liability and warranty theories.
The court's decision regarding the defective nature of the heli-
copter must be considered to be too limited. For liability to be
imposed, the product need not be manufactured or designed im-
properly, but rather it must create an unreasonable danger to the
consumer. This helicopter, having been represented as equipped
with an engine containing shot-peened bolts, created an unreason-
able danger to the purchaser who depended upon the quality of
those bolts. With such a defect existing, the strict liability in tort
and implied warranties theory should not have been dismissed.
"Defectiveness" must not be limited to improper manufacture or
4' See note 8 supra.
See note 40 supra.
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design of the product, but must include any aspect of the product
which would render the product unreasonably dangerous to the
ultimate user.
Gary D. Elliston
ANTITRUST-PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF THE CAB-The Dis-
trict Court Had Jurisdiction to Issue a Preliminary Injunction Upon
Foremost's Prima Facie Showing of Antitrust Violations. Fore-
most International Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways Ltd., 525 F.2d
281 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 957 (1976).
Foremost International Tours, Inc. is engaged in the wholesale
business of producing, packaging, selling, and operating inclusive
tours to the South Pacific from various points in the United States
and Canada. Until March 31, 1974, Qantas Airways Limited was a
participating airline in one of Foremost's tours. Sometime shortly
thereafter, Oantas entered the inclusive tour market in direct com-
petition with Foremost. Foremost subsequently brought this antitrust
suit in the District Court of Hawaii against Qantas, alleging viola-
tions of sections one and two of the Sherman Act1 and complain-
ing that the circumstances surrounding Qantas' entry into the in-
clusive tour business showed an intent to eliminate Foremost as
a competitor.! Seeking monetary and injunctive relief, Foremost
moved for a preliminary injunction while Qantas cross-moved for
a summary judgment. The district court issued a preliminary in-
junction and, while retaining jurisdiction, stayed the proceedings
ISecton I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), generally makes illegal
any contract, combination, or conspiracy, which is in restraint of trade or com-
merce. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), provides a penalty
for such monopolization or restraint in the form of a fine and/or a prison term.
'More particularly, Foremost sought relief against Quantas' alleged below-
cost pricing of inclusive tours and the alleged unfair appropriation of business
through the practice of "tour switching." Finding that Foremost made a prima
facie showing of antitrust violations, the district court made the following key
finding of fact:
In April, 1973, Foremost sold 310 (passenger) tours; in April,
1974, 102. In May, 1973, Foremost sold 851 tours; in May, 1974,
65. In June, 1973, Foremost sold 539 tours; as of June 20, 1974, 29.
Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways Ltd., 379 F. Supp. 88, 92 (D. Ha-
waii 1974).
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until the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) could consider those
matters which were in its primary jurisdiction.' Qantas appealed,
arguing that it was inappropriate for the district court to issue the
injunction.' Held, affirmed: The district court had jurisdiction to
issue a preliminary injunction upon Foremost's prima facie show-
ing of antitrust violations. Foremost International Tours, Inc. v.
Qantas Airlines Ltd., 525 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 957 (1976).
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938' was passed during a time
of general disillusionment over the value of free, unrestrained com-
petition. In fact, one of the main aims of the Civil Aeronautics Act
was to eliminate so-called "cut-throat competition" among the air
carriers.! To do this, however, a rather pervasive scheme of regula-
tion was contemplated and enacted.! To prevent monopolistic
combinations, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958' (the Act) makes
3 As examples of the issues within the CAB's primary jurisdiction, the district
court listed: "whether an airline such as Qantas may conduct an in-house tour
operation, whether the acts of Qantas alleged in the complaint constitute unfair
or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation, or
the sale thereof, and whether the acts of Qantas alleged in the complaint have
anticompetitive effects." Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways Ltd., 379
F. Supp. 88, 98 (D. Hawaii 1974). The Ninth Circuit listed another example:
"whether by means of improper accounting methods relating to fixed cost allo-
cation and translation of foreign exchange rates, Qantas was violating its tariff
and illegally subsidizing its land tour operations with air fare revenues." 525 F.2d
at 283.
'On appeal, Qantas raised the following issues: (1) whether it was appro-
priate for the district court to issue a preliminary injunction when: (a) the sub-
ject matter was arguably within the primary jurisdiction of the CAB; (b) the
CAB arguably could have provided, under the suspension power of 49 U.S.C. S
1482(j)(2) (1970), the prophylactic relief sought by Foremost; and (c) the pro-
visions of § 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. S 1384 (1970), grant
a limited antitrust immunity to various acts approved by the CAB; and (2) re-
gardless of the outcome of the first issue, whether the requirements for the issu-
ance of the preliminary injunction were met in this case at all. Discussion in this
article will be centered around issue (1)(a) and (1)(b).
sCh. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
'Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 399 (1973)
(dissenting opinion). For a discussion of the traditional arguments surrounding
the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1939, see Comment, 42 J. Am L. &
COM. 187 (1976).
7 H.R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1 (1938); see Jones, The
Anomaly of the Civil Aeronautics Board in American Government, 20 J. Am L.
& COM. 140, 141 (1953); see also, REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 280 (1955).
' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. S§ 1301
et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
52 Stat. 973 [hereinafter cited in text as "the Act"].
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illegal certain mergers, consolidations, and other transactions with-
out the consent of the CAB.' Section 412" of the Act requires
every air carrier to file with the CAB a copy of every contract or
agreement that "affects" air transportation. Once filed, the CAB,
by order, either approves or disapproves such agreement or con-
tract.' The importance of the CAB's power under section 412 is
magnified because the CAB, by so ordering, can effectively relieve
an air carrier from the operation of the antitrust laws.' This form-
idable power"3 was granted in order to enable the CAB to regulate
949 U.S.C. 1378 (1970).
1049 U.S.C, 1382(a) (1970) provides:
Every air carrier shall file with the Board a true copy, or, if oral,
a true and complete memorandum, of every contract or agreement
(whether enforceable by provisions for liquidated damages, pen-
alties, bonds, or otherwise) affecting air transportation and in force
on the effective date of this section or hereafter entered into, or
any modification or cancellation thereof, between such air carrier
and any other air carrier, foreign air carrier, or other carrier for
pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, traffic, service, or equip-
ment, or relating to the establishment of transportation rates, fares,
charges, or classifications, or for preserving and improving safety,
economy, and efficiency of operation, or for controlling, regulat-
ing, preventing, or otherwise eliminating destructive, oppressive,
or wasteful competition, or for regulating stops, schedules, and
character of service, or for other cooperative working arrangements.
1149 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (1970):
The Board shall by order disapprove any such contract or agree-
ment, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be
adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this chapter, and
shall by order approve any such contract or agreement, or any
modification or cancellation thereof, that it does not find to be ad-
verse to the public interest, or in violation of this chapter; except
that the Board may not approve any contract or agreement between
an air carrier not directly engaged in the operation of aircraft in
air transportation and a common carrier subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act, as amended, governing the compensation to be re-
ceived by such common carrier for transportation services per-
formed by it.
1249 U.S.C. 5 1384 (1970):
Any person affected by any order made under Sections 1378, 1979
or 1382 of this title shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the opera-
tions of the 'antitrust laws,' as designated in Section 12 of Title 15,
and of all other restraints or prohibitions made by, or imposed
under, authority of law, insofar as may be necessary to enable
such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by
such order.
For discussion of express and implied exemption from the antitrust law, see Com-
ment, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 559 (1973).
"The power of the CAB to exempt air carriers from the operation of the
antitrust laws has been termed "one of the most formidable powers possessed by
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more effectively those matters congressionally delegated to it.' The
CAB is further given the power to supervise and inquire into air
carrier management" and to limit interlocking directorships when
"public interest" demands it." At issue in the Foremost case, along
with the question of antitrust immunity, was another significant
provision of the Act-Section 411.17 This section generally pro-
hibits unfair methods of competition and authorizes the Board to
issue cease and desist orders where it finds foreign or domestic air
carriers or ticket agents to have been engaged in "unfair or decep-
tive practices or unfair methods of competition."
The legislative history of this regulatory scheme indicates that
the CAB was to have broad jurisdiction over air carriers."8 Regula-
tion of competition among carriers was a primary concern."' The
any Government agency." Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent
Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931, 949 (1960).
"Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 400-03
(1973).
1-49 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970).
1849 U.S.C. § 1379 (1970).
1749 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970) provides:
The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint by any
air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent, if it considers that
such action by it would be in the interest of the public, investigate
and determine whether any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket
agent has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or
unfair methods of competition in air transportation or the sale
thereof. If the Board shall find, after notice and hearing, that such
air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in such
unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition, it
shall order such air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent to
cease and desist from such practices or methods of competition.
"H.R. REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., stated at 1:
It is the purpose of this legislation to coordinate in a single inde-
pendent agency all of the existing functions of the Federal Govern-
ment with respect to civil aeronautics, and, in addition, to author-
ize the new agency to perform certain new regulatory functions
which are designed to stabilize the air transportation industry in
the United States.
See also Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304
(1963).
" See 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) which prescribes the general duties and aims
of the Act. It provides in part:
In the exercise and performance of its power and duties under this
chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other things,
as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public
convenience and necessity: ...
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to rec-
ognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest
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various sections previously cited evidence Congress' intent to give
the CAB power to deal with at least some antitrust problems."° Yet,
while the regulatory scheme appears pervasive, it does not totally
preempt the operation of the antitrust laws.' The problem evolves
into a determination of whether an antitrust dispute falls within
the expertise of the administrative agency or whether it is a matter
that initially is judicially cognizable. The doctrine of primary juris-
diction has traditionally operated to postpone adjudication by the
courts of a controversy raising issues within the agency's compe-
tence until the agency resolves such issues." While easily stated,
this doctrine has not been applied with such ease in resolving vari-
ous antitrust issues.'0
degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such
transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordi-
nate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations,
undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competi-
tive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound de-
velopment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States,
of the Postal Service, and of the national defense; ....
20Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304 (1963).
"Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 387 (1973).
See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 305 (1963),
where the Court pointed out that "while the Board is empowered to deal with
numerous aspects of what are normally thought of as antitrust problems, those
expressly entrusted to it encompass only a fraction of the total." It should be
noted that the CAB is not empowered to award damages and therefore, is not
in conflict with a claim for treble damages as provided by the antitrust laws.
See S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 191 F.2d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952); Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd. v. Trans-
Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 78 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D. Hawaii 1948).
"See generally 3 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE, ch. 19 (1958);
Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered: The Antitrust Laws, 102 U. PA. L.
REv. 577 (1954); Latta, Primary Jurisdiction in the Regulated Industries and the
Antitrust Laws, 30 U. CINN. L. REV. 261 (1961); von Mehren, The Antitrust
Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARV.
L. REv. 929 (1954); Fox, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: A Re-
appraisal of the Role of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 2 MEM. ST. U.L.
REv. 279 (1972); Kestenbaum, Primary Jurisdiction to Decide Antitrust Juris-
diction: A Practical Approach to the Allocation of Functions, 55 GEO. L.J. 812
(1967).
" See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426
(1907); United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 39 F.2d 204 (S.D.N.Y.
1929), afl'd, 284 U.S. 474 (1932); Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines,
Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953); Far
E. Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
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In the aviation context, conflict can arise if a court enjoins cer-
tain practices as being in violation of the antitrust laws, while the
CAB concurrently determines that such practice is necessary to the
development of air transportation."' To avoid such conflict, if the
particular matter is clearly within the CAB's competence, the court
will normally defer to the jurisdiction of the CAB rather than grant
injunctive relief without such prior resort." Historically, however,
the courts have not been totally consistent in the application of this
doctrine.
In the 1951 case of S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Association of
America," plaintiff, a nonscheduled air carrier, sued an association
of regularly certificated air carriers for treble damages and an
injunction against an alleged combination in restraint of trade.
The principal allegations centered around the association's attempts
to eliminate competition through various pooling and non-com-
petitive agreements.27 Finding such allegations to be within the
CAB's primary jurisdiction, the court referred that part of the
action asking for an injunction to the CAB while remanding the
portion seeking treble damages with a stay order until the CAB
had acted."
Later in the same year, in Slick Airways v. American Airlines,"'
another court reached a contrary result. In that case, plaintiff air-
lines also sought treble damages and injunctive relief based on
allegations of a conspiracy to drive a competitor out of business
by predatory rate policies. Defendants argued that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction dictated that the court should stay the pro-
21See S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir.
1951), where the Court aptly phrased this problem at 663:
Otherwise, we might have the spectacle of courts throughout the
country enjoining practices as violations of the antitrust laws even
though the agency specifically authorized to deal with them has
determined or may decide, subject to judicial review, that such prac-
tices serve the interest of the national air transportation policy.
"Laveson v. Trans World Airlines, 471 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1972); Allied Air
Freight, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 393 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968); S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am.,
191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd. v. Hawaiian Air-
lines, Ltd., 174 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1949).
26 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
27 Id. at 662.
2 1 Id. at 664.
29 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953).
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ceeding until the CAB had decided whether defendants' method of
competition were unfair. The district court did not agree, notwith-
standing the decision in S.S.W., and refused to refer the matter to
the CAB."0 The court pointed out that the CAB had no power to
award damages, and, therefore, the plaintiff would have had an
inadequate remedy. 1
Shortly thereafter, an independent ticket agency sought treble
damages and injunctive relief against four scheduled air carriers
and two trade associations in Apgar Travel Agency, Inc. v. Inter-
national Air Transport Association.' The ticket agency alleged
in substance that defendants had monopolized and restrained trade
by commercially boycotting plaintiff because it had represented
non-scheduled carriers. Following S.S.W., the court stayed further
proceedings until CAB action.' Although troubled by the lack of
CAB authority to award damages,"M the court noted there was a
need for uniformity and consistency which requires preliminary
resort to "agencies that are better equipped than courts by speciali-
zation, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible
procedure."' As such, the court concluded that the controversy
over non-scheduled air carriers was a difficult and specialized prob-
lem not within the "conventional experience" of judges."6
More recently, questions of primary jurisdiction have generally
turned on the type of relief sought and not the issues to be determin-
ed. In Allied Air Freight v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
37
plaintiff sought treble damages only, alleging that defendants had
entered into an agreement to force plaintiff out of business. In
30Id. at 214.
31 Id. at 211. The court noted that it was not deciding the question of whether
the CAB had primary jurisdiction in a case where the plaintiff seeks only injunc-
tive relief as opposed to a combination of injunctive relief and damages.
12 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
13 Id. at 709. The court summarily refused to follow the rationale of Slick,
instead finding that Congress intended to give the CAB "special status with rela-
tion to the antitrust laws." Id.
4Id. at 711.
T1 Id. at 711-12. This language quoted by the court was taken from Far East
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952), where the Court de-
ferred to the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Maritime Board to exmept op-
eration of a conference rate structure from the antitrust laws.
Id. at 712.
37393 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968); see Note,
35 J. AIR L. & COM. 275 (1969).
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holding for the plaintiff, the Second Circuit found no need to resort
to the CAB, because plaintiff was suing for past antitrust violations
and asking for a remedy-treble damages-which the CAB could
not provide." This decision was followed by the Second Circuit in
Breen Air Freight, Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc." In this case, plaintiff
sought treble damages against several defendants for alleged viola-
tions of the antitrust laws due to their joint refusal to deal with
plaintiffs as an air freight delivery service. Defendants argued that
the primary jurisdiction of the CAB should be invoked and the
action stayed. The court disagreed and held that the primary juris-
diction doctrine was not applicable, since the CAB did not have
the power to immunize the agreement in question because section
4120 was limited to "air carriers," and defendants were not within
the definition of "air carriers. 4' Alternatively, the court held that
even if the CAB could immunize the agreements under Section
412, invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was not re-
quired because the issues involved were not technical, the CAB
could not award treble damages, and there was no need to seek
uniformity in this instance.'
While the courts in Allied and Breen refused to invoke the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction on the grounds that the plaintiffs in-
volved sought a remedy not awardable by the CAB, more recent
decisions criticize this rationale.' In Laveson v. Trans World Air-
lines," the Third Circuit invoked the primary jurisdiction doctrine
where plaintiffs sought damages only, based upon an alleged con-
08 393 F.2d at 445. The Second Circuit distinguished S.S.W. and Apgar on the
grounds that plaintiffs in those cases sought injunctive relief as well as treble
damages and that their claims had been current rather than past ones. Id. at
446-47. The court further indicated that uniformity was not demanded in this
instance and that the primary jurisdiction doctrine was flexible enough to allow
the courts and the agencies to split the workload between them.
1*470 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); see Note,
39 J. AIR L. & COM. 453 (1973).
4049 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1970) [text set out in note 10 supra].
41470 F.2d at 771.
'2d. at 774. See also Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 349 F.
Supp. 1064 (D. Hawaii 1972); contra Laveson v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
471 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1972); Price v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 481 F.2d 844
(9th Cir. 1973).
'See Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 610 (W.D.
Mo. 1976); Price v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 481 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1973);
Laveson v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 471 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1972).
-"471 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1972).
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spiracy to fix the price coach passengers paid for the rental of
headsets used with inflight movies.' The court went on to say that
since the challenged actions were of "debatable legality" and were
within the regulatory jurisdiction of the CAB, resort should be
made to the CAB."°
Much of the confusion over the propriety of invoking the pri-
mary jurisdiction doctrine in a particular case can be traced to the
Supreme Court decisions in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
United States"7 and Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc."
In Pan American, a suit for injunctive relief was instituted at the re-
quest of the CAB against Pan American and others."9 Acting upon
allegations that defendants had conspired to monopolize trade routes
between certain points in the United States and South America, the
district court held that Pan American had violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held that the Act had vested
the CAB with exclusive authority to grant injunctive relief in cer-
tain instances. "° The Court reasoned that "two regimes might col-
45 Id. at 83-84, where the court noted:
The rationale for applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine does
not depend upon the particular kind of relief plaintiffs request.
Rather, it rests upon a judicial reluctance to hold practices within
the scope of any agency's jurisdiction to be antitrust violation and
then to act upon such holding by granting relief---damages or in-
junction-before prior resort to the agency.
Id. See also cases cited in note 25 supra.
1371 U.S. 296 (1963).
48409 U.S. 363 (1973). In 1973, the Supreme Court decided four other cases
involving antitrust issues in a regulated industry. See Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines,
Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973); Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973);
Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973). For a discussion of all
of these cases, see Robinson, Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
163 (1974).
49 The defendants named were Pan American World Airways, W. R. Grace
& Co., and their jointly owned subsidiary Pan American-Grace Airways (Pana-
gra). The complaint alleged that Pan American and Grace had conspired to
monopolize air commerce between the East Coast of the United States and the
West Coast of South America. Pan American argued it possessed immunity from
the operation of the antitrust laws by virtue of CAB approval of its Through
Flight Agreement with Panagra, 8 C.A.B. 50 (1947). Pan American also argued
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required original resort at the agency
level and that the district court was therefore without jurisdiction. United States
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
0 371 U.S. at 310. The court listed as instances questions of division of terri-
tories, the allocation of routes, and the affiliation of common carriers with air
carriers.
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lide" if the courts were to "intrude independently with their con-
struction of the antitrust laws."'" The Court concluded that "Con-
gress must have intended to give it [the CAB] authority that was
ample to deal with the evil at hand."'"
When Pan American was decided, previous speculatione that
the antitrust laws might yield totally to the CAB's exclusive au-
thority to deal with virtually any antitrust problem involving the
air industry seemed to be more than mere conjecture." The stand-
ards and principles propounded in Pan American were affirmed
by the Court in the Hughes Tool Co. case. In this case, TWA
sought treble damages, complaining about the method and man-
ner in which Hughes Tool Co. (Toolco) had acquired and exer-
cised control of TWA."' Holding that the CAB had immunized
Toolco's acquisitions from the antitrust laws, the Court was care-
ful to emphasize that every transaction or acquisition was approved
by a CAB order based on a finding that such transactions were
"just and reasonable and in the public interest."'"
Foremost brought its complaint to the district court in the wake
of the Hughes decision, alleging antitrust violations which were
arguably within the primary jurisdiction of the CAB or, in addi-
tion, were immunized from the operation of the antitrust laws by
previous CAB actions." Qantas argued that the issues of "below
"Id. at 310.
52 1d. at 312.
22 See, e.g., Schwartz, Legal Restrictions of Competition in the Regulated In-
dustries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REv. 436, 469-70
(1954). See also Comment, 39 J. AIR LAw & COM. 559, 591-92 (1973).
"
4 The dissenting opinion in Pan American indicated that the decision of the
Court would create a "pro tanto repeal of the antitrust laws" since the law to be
applied when dealing with section 411 would not be based on the standard of
competition embodied in the antitrust laws, but rather would be decided in light
of the nebulous "public interest" standard of section 102 of the Act. The dissent
further urged the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine so the courts
would not lose all jurisdiction over an antitrust action. 371 U.S. at 319-21, 331-32.
See also Schwartz, note 53 supra, and Comment, note 53 supra.
5449 F.2d 51, 71 (2d Cir. 1971).
51409 U.S. at 379.
17 The sale of inclusive tours in foreign air transportation is governed by the
rules and regulations established by the International Air Transport Association
(IATA). In 1966, IATA Resolution 810d was filed with the Board for approval.
This Resolution defined the principles under which inclusive tours may be begun
by IATA airline members. The American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) filed
an objection with the Board against the approval of IATA Resolution 810d on
the grounds that the entry of the airlines into the inclusive tour market would
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cost pricing" and "switching of tours" were matters eminently
within the CAB's expertise under section 411 of the Act and as
such required resort to the CAB before the court could act."' The
district court agreed with Qantas' argument that the CAB had
initial jurisdiction by holding that Foremost was a "ticket agent"
within the meaning of the Act and by interpreting the phrase "air
transportation or the sale thereof" as used in section 411 to en-
compass these allegedly unlawful activities."' Nevertheless, the
court found that the "very real" danger that Foremost would
suffer irreparable injury justified the limited injunctive relief sought
by Foremost. 0
The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion, but on a some-
what different rationale. It pointed out that the anticompetitive
effects were not limited to the regulated (airline) industry, but had
an adverse effect on a firm in an industry not regulated per se by
the CAB."1 The appeals court reasoned that since the CAB lacked
authority to regulate all the parties involved, it could not make the
accommodations and effect the compromises which are the "hall-
mark of agency regulation."'" More importantly, the court empha-
sized that the CAB lacked the expertise and incentive to act on
inter-industry problems." Thus, while affirming the district court's
create substantial unfair competition for the independent travel agency industry.
CAB Order No. E-24886, pp. 2-3, Docket 25513 (April 17, 1974). Note that it
has been held that Board approval of an IATA Resolution or agreement confers
antitrust immunity with respect to the subject matter thereof by virtue of Section
414 of the Act. National Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
"' See note 24 supra.
"9 379 F. Supp. at 95.
"Id. at 97. The district court pointed out that section 2 of the Sherman Act
may be violated by an attempt to monopolize, even though the desired end of
monopoly power is not attained. Plaintiffs need only prove a specific intent to
monopolize and the dangerous possibility of success. See, e.g., Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953). Furthermore, the
court noted that the requirement of a dangerous probability of success is met by
the evidence that because Qantas is owned by the Australian Government and
because it controls a large share of the South Pacific market, it can absorb cer-
tain costs and overhead in its air fare and therefore give the consumer a lower
tour fare. 379 F. Supp. at 95 n.8. This showing, the court held, sufficiently war-
ranted a preliminary injunction which the court can issue whenever there is a
sufficient showing of irreparable injury. See Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205 (2d Cir. 1970). See also note 2 supra.
1 525 F.2d at 285.
62 Id.
' Id. The court warned that "in cases such as this, the regulatory agency might
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actions, the Ninth Circuit did not summarily adopt the lower
court's views on the role of the CAB in antitrust matters.
The different reasoning used by the two courts in this case ex-
emplifies the problems of consistent application of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in the antitrust area. The district court had
little difficulty in holding that the issues raised were within the
CAB's jurisdiction to decide and regulate."4 The Ninth Circuit, on
the other hand, recognized that even though the CAB had a "sub-
stantial interest" in the litigation, it did not have exclusive jurisdic-
tion, and therefore the court felt it must maintain its jurisdiction
and utilize its power (including the issuance of preliminary injunc-
tions), as it finds necessary." The basic difference seems to be that
the district court represents a position more deferential to the CAB
than that of the appeals court. The Ninth Circuit explained that
where the antitrust problem is not confined to the regulated in-
dustry, other factors and policy considerations may substantially
alter the desirability of according such "substantial deference" to an
agency which does not have a sufficiently broad perspective." The
court, however, failed to clarify these factors and policy considera-
tions. Consequently, this decision fails to add any lucidity to the
favor its own regulated industry at the expense of non-regulated commerce, or
at the very least, might consider the resolution of such matters to be of a less
pressing priority."
11379 F. Supp. at 95.
1 525 F.2d at 286.
68 Id. at 285. But it can be argued that while analytically this is an inter-
industry problem, previous CAB action substantiates Qantas' position that prob-
lems similar to those involved have been heretofore regulated and as such fall
within the CAB's primary jurisdiction. See 14 C.F.R. S 378 (1974), entitled
Inclusive Tour Charters By Supplemental Air Carriers, Certain Foreign Air Car-
riers, and Tour Operators; 14 C.F.R. § 378a (1974) entitled One-Stop Inclusive
Tour Charters. See Trans World Air Lines, Inc., Flying Mercury, Inc.-Enforce-
ment Proceedings-CAB Docket No. 24697, CAB Order No. 73-6-9 (June 4,
1973), where the CAB dealt with a practice which had developed wherein the
land portion of an inclusive tour program was such that the tour participant
rarely made use of it and it was therefore referred to in the industry as a "throw-
away." After investigation, the CAB ordered TWA and Flying Mercury to cease
and desist "from engaging in unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods
of competition within the meaning of Section 411 of the Act" by selling and
operating inclusive tours in such a way as to permit the "throw-away" factors to
persist. CAB Order No. 73-6-9, at 7. See also Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB,
298 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1962), where the court upheld the authority of the CAB
to regulate the packaging and sale of tours by a hotel which included free air
transportation as a part of the tour.
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"murky area"" of primary jurisdiction in the context of antitrust
immunity.
It is important, however, to note that both the district court and
the Ninth Circuit were primarily concerned with providing Fore-
most an expedient remedy which the CAB had no power to grant.'
By granting a preliminary injunction, the court recognized that, not-
withstanding the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CAB does
not have all of the tools necessary to deal with issues of unfair
competition. The court has implicitly affirmed the observation
made by the Supreme Court in Pan American that the regulatory
scheme involved here was not "designed completely to displace
the antitrust laws."" Criminal penalties and the recovery of dam-
ages for antitrust violations remain within the court's domain.
While it could possibly be argued that the court in Foremost issued
a mandate to the CAB or Congress to establish a more expeditious
proceeding whereby a temporary cease and desist order could be
issued by the CAB,' the more important aspect of this case is that
the court may have signalled a judicial intrusion into the CAB's
regulatory authority over air carriers and air transportation. Using
the rationale of the Ninth Circuit, courts may use their powers
when necessary to enjoin activities within the CAB's expertise
whenever those activities have an adverse affect upon a firm in an
"unregulated" industry. Whether Foremost is an "unregulated" in-
dustry is an arguable issue." The court here, however, made that
determination and awarded relief which the CAB in its proceed-
ings could find to be erroneous if it determines Qantas' activity
was sufficiently immunized from operation of the antitrust laws. If
the CAB so decides, then the objectives of uniformity and avoid-
ance of agency/court conflict will have been thwarted. This gen-
eral conclusion, however, can only be substantiated by future de-
cisions involving issues as unsettled as those involved in Foremost.
Until Congress clarifies the CAB's role in the enforcement of the
67 This was the term used by one author to describe the area of primary juris-
diction as it relates to the antitrust laws. Robinson, Antitrust Developments:
1973, 74 COLUM. L REv. 165 (1974).
" 525 F.2d at 287 n.4; 379 F. Supp. at 96-97 n.7.
" 371 U.S. at 305.
'0 See 525 F.2d at 287 n.4.
71 See note 66 supra.
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antitrust laws or until the courts clearly define what constitutes
"regulation" of an industry, inconsistency in the application of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine will continue to permeate judicial de-




EXPANSION-Any Approval of an Airport Layout Plan, Which
Has Not Previously Been Granted Approval, Constitutes Federal
Action in the Meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 and Requires Environmental Processing or Conditional
Approval Pending Environmental Processing. City of Boston v.
Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 698 (D. Mass. 1975).
In 1974 the Massachusetts Port Authority (Authority) prepared
an Airport Layout Plan for proposed expansion to Logan Airport
of existing runways1 and construction of a new runway.' The Air-
port Layout Plan was submitted to the Federal Aviation Authority
(FAA) in accordance with the Airport and Airway Development
Act of 1970 (AADA).' Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunc-
tion against approval of the Airport Layout Plan pending com-
pliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).' Plaintiffs alleged that an Environmental Impact State-
ment' was required on all proposed construction, since approval
of the Airport Layout Plan was now federal activity as set out
in new Federal Aviation Administration orders.! Held, Granted:
Any approval of an airport layout plan, which has not previously
I Extensions to present runways 4 L-22 R and 9-27. City of Boston v. Brine-
gar, 6 ERC 1961 (D. Mass. 1974).
2 General Aircraft/Short Take Off and Landing Runway 14-32. Id.
'Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
(1970 & Supp. III 1973).
4 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [NEPA], 42 U.S.C. S
4332(2)(c) (1970).
"Id. at 5 102(2)(c).
I FAA Order 5050.2A. Adopted Feb. 24, 1975.
1977]
198 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [43:197
been granted approval, constitutes federal action within the mean-
ing of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and re-
quires environmental processing or conditional approval pending
environmental processing. City of Boston v. Coleman, 397 F.
Supp. 698 (D. Mass. 1975).
The National Environmental Protection Act is supposed to em-
body a cohesive national policy to bring about a productive coex-
istence between man and the environment to enhance the attractive-
ness of those measures which halt the destruction of this balance.'
Furthermore, Congress foresaw the principal objective of NEPA as
a practical outline for implementing environmental protection
policy at the federal agency level.'
To prevent irreparable injury to the environment, the best time
to evaluate a project's impact is before the actual work on the
project has begun.' In formulating this Act, Congress, and especial-
ly Senator Henry Jackson, the sponsor, was adamant about making
it an effective and viable tool.1' Therefore, the bill was drafted to
impose a duty on federal agencies to comply "to the fullest extent
possible. 1 so that it would be more than a nicely-phrased state-
ment of desire."2 It would appear that Congress intended that an
7 NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) provides: "The purpose of this chapter is:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable har-
mony between man and his environment; to promote effects which prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment."
' ENVIR. REP. (BNA)-Federal Laws, 71:0301, para. 1 (1970). "[The princi-
pal objective is] to build into the agency decision-making process an appropriate
and careful consideration of the environmental aspects of proposed action, and
to assist agencies in implementing not only the letter, but the spirit of the act."
' While the use of a facility can cause environmental damage (e.g. noise pol-
lution in an airport), many times the construction itself, or preparations for con-
struction, may cause the damage (e.g., filling part of a bay for airport extension).
10S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). "A statement of national
policy for the environment-like other major policy declarations-is in large
measure concerned with principle rather than detail; with an expression of broad
national goals rather than narrow and specific procedures for implementation.
But if goals and principles are to be effective, they must be capable of being ap-
plied in action."
"' CONF. REP. TO S. 1075, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 39,701, 39,702-03.
12 Hearings on S. 1975, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the Senate Interior and
Insular Affairs Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1969):
It seems to me that a statement of policy by the Congress should
at least consider measures to require the Federal agencies, in sub-
mitting proposals, to contain within the proposals an evaluation
of the effects of these proposals on the state of the environment.
• . .It would not be enough, it seems to me, when we speak of
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EIS be filed in contemplation of future action.
There was, however, a major problem with the drafting of
NEPA: the failure to define "Major Federal Action."1 This caused
confusion as to when the Act's provisions should be triggered.
One court very liberally construed the provisions of NEPA to im-
pose strict standards of compliance." Under the Administrative
Procedure Act"3 a possible avenue was open to force compliance
by judicial action, preventing otherwise delinquent federal agencies
from ignoring the spirit of NEPA. Nevertheless, the legislation
afforded the federal agencies themselves the opportunity to become
the leaders in composing the practical structure of national en-
vironmental policy."
The goal is the earliest possible evaluations of environmental
consequences. There is great advantage to placing the practical
implementation of NEPA within the federal agencies: each agency
is usually the first federal entity to have contact with a project af-
fecting the environment. Several courts have accepted this idea.'
An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) becomes especially
important considering the importance of evaluating location in
airport construction." Legal scholars have noted that the unfor-
policy, to think that a mere statement of desirable outcomes would
be sufficient to give us the foundation that we need for a vigorous
program of what I would call national defense against environ-
mental degradation. We need something that is firm, clear, and op-
erational.
"Silva v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 783, 784 (D. Mass. 1972).
"4 Calvert Cliffs' Co-ordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
'1 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1971). Under S 706, a re-
viewing court can determine not only all relevant questions of law, but can as
well set aside agency action committed without observance of procedures re-
quired by law.
11 Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. § 308 (1970). President Nixon said of the
NEPA, "The Federal Government shall provide leadership in protecting and en-
hancing the quality of the Nation's environment to sustain and enrich human life.
Federal agencies shall initiate measures needed to direct their policies, plans and
programs so as to meet national environmental goals."
11 Irreparable damage, in the context of an action to enforce NEPA, consists
of the failure by responsible authorities to fully evaluate the environmental im-
pact before engaging in a project which constitutes major federal action. City of
Boston v. Brinegar, 6 ERC 1961, 1965 (D. Mass. 1974); Dick Jones v. District
of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 6 ERC 1534 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974).
"8 See Harper, The Airport Location Problem: The Case of Minneapolis-
St. Paul, 38 ICC PRAC. J. 550 (1971).
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tunate reality is that environmental concerns are given little weight
in airport planning." Seeing this, the same court had previously
observed:
Clearly, insistence on the traditional concept of the necessity of
actual physical harm or damage to trigger preliminary equitable
relief would bar virtually all such relief in actions seeking to en-
force compliance with NEPA. The allegedly harmful action may
eventually be taken notwithstanding full compliance with NEPA,
which requires only consideration of environmental factors."
Similarly, legal commentary has addressed the problems resul-
tant from an EIS not being required at the planning stage,"' and
one critic strongly urged judicial activism to bring about this
result." Notably, each of these commentators dealt with an earlier
proceeding in the Logan Airport expansion. An after-the-fact EIS
was only managing to predict harm which was by then irreversible.
Quite often it is the disruption of the act of construction itself,
or land clearing or filling, or the erection of a permanent or semi-
permanent structure which causes the harm, and not the existence
of the final project.
The controversy surrounding the expansion of Logan Airport
(Airport) provides a good study of the evolution of the FAA's
approach to NEPA. Under the Airport Development Aid Pro-
gram,"3 approval of the Airport Layout Plan is a prerequisite to
any federal grant of financial aid. The AADA falls within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation (DOT) and is
administered by the FAA. The first significant federal involvement
in the present expansion of the Airport occurred in December 1969
when the Authority submitted an Airport Layout Plan to the
FAA."' The FAA gave its general approval in early 1970,1 and the
" See Berger, You Know I Can't Hear You When the Planes Are Flying, 4
URn. LAW. 1 (1972); Comment, Jetport: Planning and Politics in the Big Cypress
Swamp, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 713 (1971).
20 City of Boston v. Brinegar, 6 ERC 1961, 1965 (D. Mass. 1974). The court
went on to state: "It may well be that the point of approval of a layout plan
would be an appropriate time to require an EIS, even though some of the pro-
jects included might never be completed, or completed only in the distant future."
21 Id.; see Note, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 550 (1975).
22 City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (lst Cir. 1972), discussed in Note,
39 J. AIR L. & COM. 121 (1973).
2 14 C.F.R. S 152.5(a) (1977).
24City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972), discussed in Note,
39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 121 (1973).
25 City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972).
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Authority commenced construction on the outer taxiway that De-
cember."' In February 1971 the Authority forwarded a request for
aid to FAA and included a "negative declaration' ' that no sig-
nificant adverse environmental impact was foreseen." The Boston
Redevelopment Authority disagreed and expressed its view to the
FAA, which in turn explained that this issue had to be resolved
before any funds would be forthcoming." Nonetheless, the Author-
ity forwarded its application for aid, which the Department of
Transportation returned in July 1971 "until an environmental im-
pact statement is prepared.
30
Up to this point in this airport expansion the Authority had re-
quested a federal grant, 1 the federal agency had made a tentative
allocation of funds," and the Authority had submitted a formal ap-
plication for approval." The court in City of Boston v. Volpe found,
however, that the project had not become "major federal action."'"
Only preparatory subjects had fallen within federal purview, and the
Authority was proceeding without federal funds and might even
have been able to complete the project without those funds. No
injunction pending the filing of an EIS would be granted.' The
action had not as yet come within the ambit of sufficient federal
action, as defined at that time, to warrant any court action.
As the Authority became more ambitious in its plans for expan-
sion, more litigation arose seeking to enjoin federal approval of
the Authority's new application for funds without an EIS." By this
2i ld.
"'There are times when a declaration showing that no change to the environ-
ment will result from a project is sufficient and avoids the costly and lengthy
preparation of an EIS.
28 City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (Ist Cir. 1972).
2"Id.
so Id.
31 14 C.F.R. § 151.21(a) (1977).
"2 14 C.F.R. S 151.21(b) (1977).
- 14 C.F.R. § 151.21(c) (1977).
"City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972). The court spoke
only of "federal action" at that point in time. Later, however, the lines of battle
were drawn around the concept of "major federal action." Bearing in mind the
time differential, the two terms are actually synonymous and are cited inter-
changeably.
8Id.
'City of Boston v. Brinegar, 6 ERC 1961 (D. Mass. 1974)..
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time, the runways project approved in the 1969 Airport Layout
Plan had been altered somewhat, but throughout the interim the
Authority and the FAA had maintained contact with each other."
The Authority submitted another request for aid, asking $2,360,-
000, fifty percent of the estimated cost, and introduced its own
environmental impact report." This report dealt mainly with the
effect of noise, which is a major consideration in airport planning."
The importance of noise, however, should not permit the exclusion
of other environmental considerations within a report. The physical
impact of the construction could also result in serious environ-
mental upheaval. The Authority had executed covenants with the
FAA agreeing to make no alterations of the airport without an
FAA-approved airport layout plan unless the changes would not
adversely affect the safety, utility, or efficiency of the Airport, in
which case they were permissible. None of the changes, actual or
proposed, were anticipated to so affect the Airport.'
The Authority had entered into a contract for airport construc-
tion for $7,764,701." Although the Authority continued actively
pursuing federal funding, and despite active negotiations between
local, state, and federal officials,' the District Court for Massachu-
setts in City of Boston v. Brinegar found that the Authority could
have continued with the project even absent federal funds. ' Again
the injunction was denied, as the court found that certain provi-
sions" specifically excluded the approval of Airport Layout Plans
from the list of federal actions requiring an EIS.' The court did
state that although much evidence had been introduced on sub-
stantial environmental impact, it would make no finding in respect
3 d. at 1962.
38 Id.
"See, Vittek, Airport Noise Control-Can Communities Live Without It?
Can Airlines Live With It?, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 473 (1972); cf. Goldstein,
Airport Noise and the Selection of Airport Sites, 43 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 229 (1972).
40 City of Boston v. Brinegar, 6 ERC 1961 (D. Mass. 1974).
4 Id. at 1963.
4' The three officials were Edward King, Executive Director of the Authority,
Alan Altshuler, Secretary of the Executive Office of Transportation and Con-
struction of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Ferres Howland, Director,
New England Region, FAA.
3 City of Boston v. Brinegar, 6 ERC 1961, 1965 (D. Mass. 1974).
"FAA Orders 1050.1A, 5050.2.
'City of Boston v. Brinegar, 6 ERC 1961, 1964 (D. Mass. 1974).
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to it.40
Such was the situation when again the case reached the court,
in a new round of litigation, as City of Boston v. Coleman." In
fact, by now the Ninth Circuit was citing the two prior City of
Boston cases as showing that FAA approval of an airport layout
plan did not require an EIS." Nevertheless, the court broke from
these earlier decisions and ordered the injunction, at least par-
tially."0
This reversal was permitted by a change in FAA Orders." FAA
Order 5050.2A superseded FAA Order 5050.2. Paragraph 32 of
the superseding Order"' states that approval of Airport Layout
Plans is an "action" for purposes of NEPA. Those FAA actions
preceding the Order were unaffected. Accordingly, the 1970 Air-
port Layout Plan was ruled properly approved since it had met all
the FAA requirements at the time it had been filed. The 1974
Id. The court maintained that:
This is the purpose for which an EIS is designed and is not for the
court to decide at this stage. Suffice it to say that I find that the
impact of airplane noise is a highly sophisticated and complex mat-
ter, involving many variables and requiring an objective study of
not only theoretical measurements based on sound patterns and ex-
ponential increases, but also on actual measurements and inquiry
into the conscious and subconscious effect on real people in the
actual neighborhoods. . . . I find, however, that no such objective
evaluation has yet been made.
"397 F. Supp. 698 (D. Mass. 1975).
4 Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975).
49 Cognizant of its shift, the court stated: "The focus of the City of Boston
cases was on enjoining construction of projects not yet federally funded, and it is
my impression that the present issue was not reached in those cases." City of
Boston v. Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 698, 700 (D. Mass. 1975).
"The order was promulgated under the authority of § 4 Department of
Transportation Order 5610.1B, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,235, 35,237 (1974). On Septem-
ber 30, 1974, the DOT delegated environmental impact statement approval au-
thority for airport projects to the FAA Administrator or his designee. Order
5050.2A laid out the guidelines the FAA was to follow in the area and was dis-
tributed to Washington Airports Service, Office of the Chief Counsel, Office of
Environmental Quality, and the Office of Aviation System Plans to branch level;
to Regional Planning Staffs to the branch level, Regional Airports Divisions and
Regional Counsel; and to all Airports District Offices. Instructions for Processing
Airport Development Actions Affecting the Environment, FAA Order 5050.2A.
Adopted Feb. 24, 1975.
1 Paragraph 32(a) orders that either an EIS must be completed under Para-
graph 20 or a negative impact statement under Paragraph 22. Paragraph 32(b)
provides for approval of an Airport Layout Plan conditional upon completion of
Paragraph 32(a) requirements. Paragraph 32(c) allows annotation of an en-
vironmental approval for any portion of the layout plan earlier approved.
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Airport Layout Plan could only be given conditional approval,
however, since it was subject to the new, more stringent regula-
tions."2
Another problem remained. The defendants appealed, claiming
the district court had erred in admitting the superseding Order
because the Order was not an FAA regulation, but rather an "ad-
vanced copy" of what was possibly intended to be published at
some future date as a Notice of Proposed Rule Making. 3 The Au-
thority claimed that the Order had not as yet complied with the
Administrative Procedure Act!' and was therefore invalid. This
point was never reached, since the case became moot before reach-
ing appeal." In the court's memorandum and order, it was deter-
mined that since the FAA had returned the 1974 Airport Layout
Plan to the Authority and the Authority no longer sought approval,
no controversy existed between the parties." In the City of Boston
v. Brinegar case, however, under similar circumstances the court
had held the Authority chargeable with knowledge of FAA Or-
ders. 7 In other words, the defendants saw little or no chance for
success on appeal, and by discontinuing the project, the Authority
was acquiescing in the decision. Although the case has not been
affirmed on appeal, that is essentially a result of the defendant's
challenge being abandoned. For that reason, and as the first judicial
interpretation of the new FAA Order, the decision's importance
remains. This case certainly signals an end to the judicial treatment
of the FAA's NEPA duties established in the two earlier City of
Boston cases.
Although the FAA was somewhat slow in adopting the proper
regulations within the spirit of NEPA" and trailed the Department
62 City of Boston v. Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 698, 701 (D. Mass. 1975).
53 Brief for Appellant at 31 et seq., City of Boston v. Coleman, 397 F. Supp.
698 (D. Mass. 1975).
14 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1971).
"City of Boston v. Coleman, 527 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1975).
5" City of Boston v. Coleman, No. 75-1418, 75-1419, unpublished Memoran-
dum and Order (lst Cir. 1975).
51 "To the extent material, the Authority is charged with knowledge of these
Orders, even though they were not published in the Federal Register. They were
referred to in prior litigation between these parties in this court ...... City of
Boston v. Brinegar, 6 ERC 1961, 1964 (D. Mass. 1974).
"The heads of federal agencies were directed to establish formal procedures
for identifying those agency actions requiring an EIS in Guidelines of the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality, 36 Fed. Reg. 1398, 7724 (1971).
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of Housing and Urban Development by over four years," now that
it has adopted these regulations, it is bound to follow them."0 Al-
though an injunction is not available against the non-federal par-
ties, 1 and although the only lever available may be unavailability
of FAA approval of the Airport Layout Plan,"a the power of with-
holding these funds could be quite substantial. While the state
would have been permitted to proceed with construction wholly
independent of the federal government," as a practical matter the
costs involved in airport construction are probably beyond the
means of a state. Conversely, where they are within the means of
the state the possibility of serious environmental damage is, of
necessity, considerably lessened. In defending its decision in City
of Boston v. Volpe, the court gave an eloquent account of the vital
role that federal funds can take in the state's or other non-federal
entity's financial planning." The court was fairly adamant in its
belief that a lack of federal funds in the Logan project would force
the Authority to abandon it altogether. This is indeed what hap-
pened. The present decision is even more potent in light of that
argument and result, since the EIS now must be filed at the plan-
ning stage, as was intended all along. Additionally, with only minor
exceptions, federal aid cannot be awarded for costs incurred prior
to the execution of the grant agreement." It is doubtful that any
major construction or expansion could be carried on today or in
the foreseeable future without the federal aid that is available only
through prompt compliance with the FAA regulations.
The City of Boston v. Coleman decision signals FAA acceptance
of the original purpose of NEPA, at least as the court has inter-
preted the new Order. The promulgation of the new regulation
forces airport planners to come to grips immediately with the en-
vironmental consequences of construction or expansion. The im-
pact of the FAA is so sudden and practically inevitable that it
might be criticized as overly coercive and an undue federal inva-
9 "Major HUD Actions Significantly Affecting the Environment" appeared
in Appendix A of the HUD guidelines issued January 22, 1971.
"aSilva v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 783 (D. Mass. 1972).
6I City of Boston v. Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 698 (D. Mass. 1975).
62 Id.
"New Windsor v. Ronan, 329 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
'4 City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972).
"49 U.S.C. § 1720(a)(2) (1970).
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sion of state or local affairs. Consideration of the time and expense
of an EIS strengthens this attack. What cannot be overlooked,
however, is the enormous effect airports have on the environment.
Realistically, few airport development projects are viable without
federal help, and the only way in which the environment can be
safeguarded as provided for in NEPA is to have the proper mea-
sures taken at the earliest possible moment. No longer must en-
vironmentalists stand on the sidelines as possibly irrevocable en-
vironmental damage is caused before "major federal action" trig-
gers NEPA requirements. With this decision, the FAA finally be-
comes an active environmental watchdog as Congress, in passing
NEPA, had envisaged it to be.
Michael Y. MacKinnon
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